The following are links to selected Circuit
Court opinions concerning admiralty and maritime law issued during the
period May through August, 2002.
Diamond Offshore Co. v. A & B Builders
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
August 30, 2002
Outer Continetal Shelf Lands Act/Indemnity/Longshore
& Harbor Workers' Act: Section 905(b) of the Longshore & Harbor
Workers' Act prohibits an indemnity claim against the employer of a covered
employee for a personal injury claim brought against a vessel. But, if
the injured employee is entitled to receive longshore benefits by virtue
of of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), then section 905(c)
provides an exception, allowing the enforcement of reciprocal indemnity
provisions between the employer and the vessel. To be entitled to benefits
by virtue of the OCSLA, the injured employee must satisfy certain "status"
and "situs" requirements under the OCSLA. Since there is no evidence here
that the drilling rig was connected to the ocean floor by its anchors or
through its drilling mechanisms, and there is no evidence of any other
contact with the seabed, the requirement that the rig be "erected" on the
OCS at the time of alleged injury was not satisfied. Thus, because there
was insufficient summary judgment evidence to determine whether the location
of alleged injury qualified under the Demette
v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2002) situs test,
partial summary judgment in favor of the vessel on the issue of whether
the employer is obligated to indemnify and defend the vessel under the
indemnity provision was not supported by the record.
McLaughlin v. Cape May Foods
Third Circuit Court of Appeals
August 21, 2002
Procedure/Admiralty Jurisdiction: Plaintiff
sought to appeal the denial of her summary judgment motion as an interlocutory
appeal in admiralty pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(3), which states
that courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from "[i]nterlocutory
decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights
and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from
final decrees are allowed." This section has been construed narrowly
to allow an appeal in admiralty after a determination of liability but
before the assessment of damages. Because the district court in denying
summary judgment made no decision establishing the rights and liabilities
of the parties, the Court lacked jurisdiction and the appeal was dismissed.
Custom
Ship Interiors v. Roberts
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
August 15, 2002
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
Because per diem payments were disbursed to the Claimant each week despite
the fact that the employer knew that he was incurring no food or lodging
expenses needing reimbursement, the judgment of the Benefits Review Board
that the payments were includable as "wages" under the Act was proper.
MacPhail v. Oceaneering International
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
August 7, 2002
Procedure/Jones Act/Settlement Agreements:
The district court abused its discretion when it enjoined defendant's action
in the Supreme Court of Western Australia that sought to enforce an earlier
agreement that settled plaintiff's personal injury claim. The district
court also erred in failing to enforce the forum selection clause in the
settlement agreement and release, whereby the parties agreed to submit
any dispute to the exclusive jurisdiction of Australian courts.
Northern Queen v. Kinnear
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
August 7, 2002
Limitation of Liability: The district
court determined that the fishing vessel was not entitled to exoneration
or a limitation because the vessel was unseaworthy at the time it sank
due to excessive ice build up and water in the bilge. Jones Act:
The estate of the vessel's deceased captain could not recover against the
owner based on the "primary duty rule." For an employer to relieve
itself of liability under the primary duty rule: (1) the seaman must have
consciously assumed a duty as a term of employment; (2) the dangerous condition
that injured the seaman must have been created by the seaman or could have
been controlled or eliminated solely by the seaman in the proper exercise
of his or her employment duties; and (3) the seaman must have knowingly
violated a duty consciously assumed as a condition of employment. The captain
here assumed responsibility for operating the vessel safely, was the sole
person who could have taken corrective action to control or eliminate the
dangerous ice and water conditions that caused the vessel to capsize and
the record established that he knew of those dangerous conditions.
Newport
News Shipbuilding v. Williams
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
July 11, 2002
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act/Statute
of Limitations: The question of whether a Claim has been filed in a
timely manner relates to when Claimant knew, or had reason to know, that
his injury was likely to impair his earning capacity. Accepting the
ALJ’s findings of fact, Claimant had no reason to know, before July 30,
1997, that his back condition was likely to impair his earning capacity.
Therefore, as a matter of law, Claimant had one year from that date, or
until July 30, 1998, to file his Claim. His Claim was then filed in a timely
manner on August 27, 1997, well within the one-year limi-tations period.
United
States v. Ex USS Cabot/Dedalo
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
July 1, 2002
Salvage/Maritime Liens: A successful
salvage claim requires three proofs: (1) marine peril; (2) voluntary service
rendered when not required as an existing duty or from a special contract;
and (3) success in whole or in part, or contribution to the success of
the operation. Since the Coast Guard proved tug assistance to the vessel
pursuant to its mandatory obligations under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, it was not acting voluntarily and hence had no valid salvage
claim or salvage lien against the vessel.
Bank
One Louisiana v. M/V Mr Dean
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
June 10, 2002
Maritime Liens/Charter Parties: A maritime
lien for breach of a charter attaches when the owner places the vessel
at the charterer's disposal and remains inchoate until perfected by a breach
or discharged by the undisturbed end of the charter. Thus the charterer's
maritime lien for breach of the charter had priority over the bank's preferred
ship mortgage since the the vessel was placed at the charterer's disposal
before the mortgage was recorded, although the owner's breach of the charter
occurred after the mortgage was recorded.
Cooper/T.
Smith Stevedoring v. Director, OWCP
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
June 5, 2002
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
Title 33 U.S.C. § 914(j) does not entitle an employer to a credit
or offset against a widow's death benefits for the overpayment of disability
benefits erroneously awarded by an administrative law judge.
Francisco
v. MT Stolt Achievement
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
June 4, 2002
Jones Act/Arbitration: The district
court properly ordered plaintiff foreign seaman's personal injury claim
to arbitration since plaintiff's employment contract containing the arbitration
provision was covered by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, which does not
contain an exclusion for seamen employment contracts as does the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
Sestich
v. Long Beach Container Terminal
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
May 20, 2002
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
The claimant's "wage-earning capacity" within the meaning of the Act is
equal to his actual post-injury earnings, and he is entitled to two-thirds
of the difference between his "wage-earning capacity" and his pre-injury
"average weekly wages." Thus because claimant's post-injury "wage-earning
capacity" exceeded his pre-injury "average weekly wages," the Board properly
held that Claimant was not entitled to benefits.
Senator
Linie v. Sunway Line
Second Circuit Court of Appeals
May 17, 2002
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"):
Where neither the carrier nor the shippers had actual or constructive knowledge
of the inherently dangerous nature of shipped goods, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(6)
imposes strict liability on the shippers for damages and expenses arising
from the shipment of those goods. Thus where the carrier incurred damages
arising from the spontaneous combustion of a chemical cargo aboard its
ship, the shippers were strictly liable for those damages even if, prior
to the shipment, they did not know and could not have known that the chemical
cargo was inherently dangerous.
United
States v. Angell
Second Circuit Court of Appeals
May 16, 2002
Government Regulation: Defendant violated
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§
401 et seq., by adding two floats to his dock in the Silver Brook Canal
in Flanders, New York, without a permit from the United States Army Corps
of Engineers ("Army Corps"). Defendant's argument that the canal was not
navigable at low tide and thus was not covered by the Act was to no avail
since the Army Corps' jurisdiction "extends to the line on the shore reached
by the plane of the mean (average) high water." 33 C.F.R. § 329.12(a)(2). |