Winter Storm Shipping v. Thai Petrochemical
Second Circuit Court of Appeals
November 6, 2002

Cape Fear v. Martin
First Circuit Court of Appeals
November 1, 2002

Madeja v. Olympic Packers
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
October 31, 2002

SeaRiver Maritime v. Mineta
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
October 31, 2002

A Fisherman's Best v. Recreational Fishing Alliance
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
October 31, 2002

City of Charleston v. A Fisherman's Best
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
October 31, 2002

Rogers v. Samedan Oil Co.
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
October 14, 2002

Hanson v. Marine Terminals Co.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
October 9, 2002

Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act: Section 914(f) is the penalty provision of the LHWCA and requires the District Director to add a 20% penalty if she finds that there is a compensation amount due a claimant and that more than ten days elapsed between the date the amount became due and the date it was delivered. A district court may not consider equitable factors when it is called upon to enforce penalties imposed under § 914(f). Thus the district court's denial of the penalty on equitable graounds was an abuse of discretion.

Thyssen v. Calypso Shipping Co.
Second Circuit Court of Appeals
September 26, 2002

Arbitration: Defendant owner did not waive its right to London arbitration by failing to raise an arbitration defense in its answer or by waiting 20 months to move to stay pending arbitration. There was no evdience that Plaintiff suffered prejudice due to the delay, which must be demonstrated to find waiver. Further, Plaintiff's in rem against the vessel was also properly referred to London arbitration. Under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), in rem proceedings serve to provide a plaintiff with security while the in personam claim awaits arbitration. An interpretation of the FAA
that would eventually allow an in rem claim to proceed in litigation after an in personam claim has been arbitrated would undermine the purpose of the Act with respect to maritime proceedings. COGSA: Referral of the in rem claim to London arrbitration did not violate section 3(8) of COGSA since Plaintiff's in rem rights were protected through the posting of a Club Letter of Undertaking as security.

Walker v. Metro Machine Co.
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
September 26, 2002
 

Wallis v. Princess Cruises
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
September 24, 2002

International Law/Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA): A contract clause in a passenger ticket that merely refers to the "Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea’ of 1976 ("Athens Convention")" did not reasonably communicate a liability limitation. The clause did not reasonably communicate the limitation such that Plaintiff could have become meaningfully informed of its terms. Thus Plaintiff, in pursuing her claim arising from the death of her husband after falling from a cruise ship off the coast of Greece, was not limited to damages of approximately $60,000 under the Athens Convention. Maritime Torts: A court has the authority to develop general maritime law regarding claims not directly governed by congressional legislation or admiralty precedent. Since there was no maritime law concerning a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the district court properly measured the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claim under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46. The Captain's conduct in stating to someone
else, but in Plaintiff’s hearing, that her husband was probably dead and that his body would be sucked under the ship, was not sufficently "extreme and outrageous" to give rise to a viable claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Procedure (Appeals): The Circuit Court had jurisdiction under the interlocutory admiralty appeals provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) where, as here, the validity and applicability of a provision limiting liability has been determined.

Martinez v. Signature Seafoods
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
September 11, 2002

Jones Act: A seaworthy fish processing barge that is towed across navigable waters twice a year can qualify as a "vessel in navigation" for certain purposes of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688.

Ventura Packers v. F/V Jeanine Kathleen
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
September 11, 2002

Maritime Liens/Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31342, establishes statutory elements, which if met, invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. The district court therefore erred in dismissing plaintiff's necessaries lien claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which dismissal was based on a finding that the contract between plaintiff and the vessel interests was not wholly maritime and that its maritime portion could not be severed from its non-maritime portion without prejudice to the vessels. Although this finding was correct, the Federal Maritime Lien Act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff, as here, has provided necessaries to a vessel.

Britton v. U.S.S Great Lakes Fleet
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
September 9, 2002

Maintenance & Cure: Where a seaman is required to provide pre-employment medical information, and he intentionally misrepresents or conceals material medical facts, he is not entitled to an award of maintenance and cure if the injury incurred is causally linked to the concealed medical condition. However, the employer must show that the non-disclosed medical information was material to its decision to hire the seaman to successfully defend against maintenance and cure. Since there was an issue of fact in this case whether the non-disclosed condition was material to the owner's decision to hire plaintiff, the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claim on motion for summary judgment. Seaworthiness: Unseaworthiness is a claim under general maritime law based on the vessel owner’s duty to ensure that the vessel is reasonably fit to be at sea. The warranty of seaworthiness requires that the ship, including the hull, decks, and machinery, be reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are used. Plaintiff's allegation that the vessel was unseaworthy because there was a shortage of crew available to open the stairwell covers and vent hatches, which lead to his having to perform those tasks alone resulting in his back injury, was sufficient to raise an issue of fact to be resolved by a jury. Jones Act: Plaintiff's allegation that the health care provider assigned by the owner failed to exercise due care when reassigning plaintiff back to work was a sufficient allegation of Jones Act negligence to be resolved by a jury.

Grosse Ile Bridge Co. v. American Steamship
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
September 9, 2002

Collisions/Casualties: On September 6, 1992, the M/V H. Lee White, a 700-foot cargo vessel carrying 67 million pounds of iron ore, struck the Grosse Ile Toll Bridge, a pivot-swinging drawbridge on the Trenton Channel of the Detroit River. The district court properly found that the bridge was at fault for not timely swinging the bridge open. The district court erred, however, in absolving the vessel from any fault. Once the captain of the vessel decided to stop short of the bridge by reversing engines, it was unreasonable to delay dropping the port-bow anchor which could have stopped the vessel short of the bridge.

Bianco v. Georgia Pacific Co.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
September 3, 2002

Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act: To be eligible for benefits under the Act, a work-related injury must occur "upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel)." 33 U.S.C. § 903(a).  Although claimant was injured at a sheet rock production plant that adjoined the navigable waters of the United States, the location of her injury was not in an area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel. Claimant was therefore not covered by the Act.