The following are links to selected
Circuit Court opinions concerning admiralty and maritime law issued during
the period January through April, 2004.
Assicurazioni
Generali v. Black & Veatch
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
March 26, 2004
Marine Insurance: On July 20, 2000,
a ship carrying the assureds' plant construction components departed Japan
for the United States. No survey was conducted at loading. On July 24,
2000, the ship was caught in a typhoon, which caused severe damage to most
of the components on board. The manufacturer replaced the damaged components
at no cost, but they did not arrive until approximately six months after
the originally scheduled delivery date. This delay resulted in additional
costs of $38 million for the assureds. Marine cargo underwriters
sought judgment declaring no coverage because of a failure to comply with
the policy' s survey requirement. The district court properly found that
no survey was required and that the claim was covered under the policy's
consequential loss provision. The policy failed to list the critical items
that were subject to the survey requirement, nor were they properly added
by a subsequent endorsement that lacked consideration.
Zyblut
v. Harvey's Iowa Management
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
March 25, 2004
Jones Act/Seamen's Claims: Admiralty
law does not preempt plaintiff seaman's claim under state law for wrongful
discharge. Under Iowa state law, to prevail on a tort claim for a discharge
in violation of public policy, an employee must show (1) a clearly defined
public policy protected an activity; (2) the policy was undermined by discharging
the employee; (3) the discharge was the result of engaging in the protected
activity; and (4) there was no other justification for the discharge. The
court concluded there was no clearly defined public policy protecting plaintiff's
activity. First, federal maritime law does not provide a clear public policy
against violating 46 U.S.C. § 8101 (addressing manning of vessels).
Second, although Iowa recognizes a public policy against terminating an
employee who refuses to violate the law, plaintiff never refused to falsify
the vessel log books, nor did he complain to the Coast Guard. Further,
plaintiff was not actually discharged, but voluntarily left his employment
after continually, albeit reluctantly, violating the law.
In re Tetra
Applied Technologies
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
March 25, 2004
Limitation of Liability Act: Claimant
was entitled to pursue his remedies in state court, although a federal
limitation action was pending, where he stipulated as follows: (1) that
Owner is entitled to and has the right to litigate all issues relating
to limitation of liability in federal court; (2) that he would not seek
in other federal or state courts any judgment or ruling on the issue of
Owner's right to limitation of liability; (3) that he would consent to
waive any claim of res judicata relevant to the issue of limitation of
liability based on any judgment that the state court may render; and (4)
that he would not seek to enforce any judgment or recovery in excess of
$725,000 (the value of the vessel) pending the adjudication of the complaint
of limitation of liability in federal court. Claimant was not required
to stipulate that exoneration from liability issues, as opposed
to limitation of liability issues, would only be heard in federal
court.
Delta Commercial
Fisheries v. Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
March 19, 2004
Government Regulation: The commercial
fishermen's association's suit alleging that the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council does not include "fair and balanced" representation
of commercial and recreational fishing interests as required by a provision
of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1801-1883, was properly dismissed by the district court since
the United States has not waived sovereign immunity from such a suit under
the Act.
Ocean
Advocates v. Corps of Engineers
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
March 15, 2004
Government Regulation: The district
court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps of Engineers
on plaintiff environmental group's challenge to a permit issued to BP to
build an addition to its existing oil refinery dock in Cherry Point, Washington.
The Corps should have realized that uncertainty surrounded the potential
for increased traffic based on the undetermined additional berthing capacity
at the BP refinery, the magnitude of this change and its relationship to
the increased risk of oil spills, and unknown, long-term projections for
increased traffic and the risk of an oil spill. The Corps acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in failing to gather this quantifiable data and in failing
to take a "hard look" at the environmental impact of the dock extension.
Further, if the modifications authorized by the permit increased the potential
berthing capacity of the terminal for tankers carrying crude oil, it also
violated the Magnuson Amendment to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 33
U.S.C. § 476., which was an issue remanded to the district court.
In re
MO Barge Lines
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
March 15, 2004
Collisions/Casualties: During the early
hours of July 31, 2000, the Miss Belterra, a new casino vessel heading
up the Mississippi River, collided with the Elizabeth Ann, a towboat
pushing concrete barges down the river. The district court properly found
that Elizabeth Ann's pilot violated Inland Navigation Rule 14 when
he failed to propose the manner of passing as he was the downward vessel.
It is mandatory that a downward vessel on the Mississippi River propose
the manner of passage and initiate the maneuvering signals that will be
used. Limitation of Liability Act: To determine a vessel owner's
entitlement to limit its damages, a court must determine (1) whether negligence
or unseaworthiness caused the accident, and (2) whether the shipowner was
privy to, or had knowledge of, the causative agent. Unseaworthiness
was not supported by the record since the pilot's decision not to increase
the radar's range when he first noticed approaching lights was navigational
error, rather than evidence of incompetence that would render the vessel
unseaworthy. Further, the towboat owner was not in privity since it had
hired a licensed, competent pilot to navigate its vessel and it was not
on notice that the pilot would operate the vessel negligently. Owner could
thus limit its liability.
Fanos v.
Maersk Line
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
March 10, 2004
Jones Act (Penalty Wages): There are
two prongs used to determine the application of the wage penalty statute:
(1) whether the master or owner refused to pay wages within the specified
period, and (2) whether this failure to pay was without sufficient cause.
See also 46 U.S.C. § 10313. Here neither prong was met since,
first, the wages were not withheld by the master or owner, but by the union's
vacation plan. Second, "without sufficient cause" means "either conduct
which is in some sense arbitrary or willful, or at least a failure not
attributable to impossibility of payment." Here there was sufficient cause
since the wages were withheld pursuant to a memorandum of understanding
between the union and the owner.
Becker
v. Poling Transportation
Second Circuit Court of Appeals
February 27, 2004
Maritime Torts: Plaintiffs were
severely burned in a fire that occurred while they were transferring petroleum
from the CLARA P, a decrepit barge, to a truck that was parked dockside.
The fire was caused by the use of the portable pump instead of a vacuum
truck to transfer petroleum from the barge to a truck. The petroleum
purchaser
was properly found directly liable to plaintiffs since it knew that the
pump on the CLARA P was out of operation and that a vacuum truck should
be used to transfer the petroleum from the barge. It also knew that
the contractor it had hired did not have a vacuum truck but hired it anyway.
Procedure: The Court of Appeals had appellate jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3), the admiralty interlocutory appeals exception.
The appellant's still pending claims for contribution did not preclude
an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 1292(a)(3) because its liability
to appellees had been finally determined and was unaffected by the contribution
cross-claim.
Air
Liquide v. Corps of Engineers
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
January 30, 2004
Government Regulation: The Army Corps
of Engineers properly exercised its navigational servitude over underwater
pipelines covered by permits under the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., requiring Owners to remove the pipelines
at their expense as part of the project by the Corps and the Port of Houston
Authority to widen and deepen the Houston Ship Channel.
Crear v.
Omega Protein
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
January 26, 2004
Maritime Torts: In support of
a general negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached
the duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered damages; and (4) the breach of the
duty proximately caused the damages. Whether a defendant owes a duty
to a plaintiff depends on various factors, and the primary indicator of
duty is whether the harm suffered by the plaintiff was foreseeable.
Here the district court correctly granted summary judgment to defendant
fishing vessel owner where a former employee who had suffered a head injury
onboard murdered his grandmother 13 months later. A reasonable employer
in defendant's position would not have foreseen that its negligence in
failing to properly affix a stern pole would cause an injured seaman to
murder another person.
Spector
v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
January 12, 2004
Government Regulation: Plaintiffs,
disabled cruise line passengers, allege that physical barriers on Norwegian
Cruise Line ships denied them access to: (1) emergency evacuation equipment
and emergency evacuation-related programs; (2) facilities such as public
restrooms, restaurants, swimming pools, and elevators; and (3) cabins with
a balcony or a window. Pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12182 et. seq., plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief requiring Owner to remove certain barriers that obstructed their
access to the ships’ facilities. The plaintiffs' barrier removal
claims were dismissed since Congress, in enacting Title III of the ADA,
failed to express any intention to subject foreign-flagged cruise ships
to its dictates. Thus, application of Title III to foreign-flagged cruise
ships is impermissible. |