UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
_______________
August Term, 1999
(Argued
January 20, 2000 Decided: September 13, 2000 )
Docket Nos. 98-1713,
98-1714
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
LEE PENG FEI, aka Ma
Lee, aka Char Lee,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________
Before:
CARDAMONE, LEVAL, and
PARKER,
Circuit
Judges.
_______________
Defendant Lee Peng Fei appeals from
his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1115 and sentence
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York (Raggi, J.).
Affirmed.
_______________
JAMES T. MORIARTY, New York, New
York, for Defendant-Appellant.
JODI L. AVERGUN, Assistant United
States Attorney, Brooklyn, New
York (Loretta E. Lynch, United States
Attorney, David C. James, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern
District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, of counsel), for
Appellee.
_______________
CARDAMONE, Circuit
Judge:
On this appeal, defendant Lee Peng
Fei (Lee) challenges his conviction for seaman's manslaughter
and his sentence for misconduct causing the deaths of six aliens
attempting to enter the United States illegally. Lee orchestrated
and financed the transportation of 300 undocumented Chinese nationals
to this country in a cargo ship called the Golden
Venture that carried them from Mombasa, Kenya to the United
States under extraordinarily inhumane conditions. The Golden
Venture was deliberately grounded at approximately 3:00
a.m. on June 6, 1993 off the coast of the Gateway Recreational
Area in Queens, New York, and in the ensuing pandemonium at least
ten people died of hypothermia or drowning. Because four of the
bodies were discovered only later, Lee was charged with the six
known deaths.
We have already affirmed the convictions
of Lee's co-conspirators in three cases, familiarity with which
is assumed. SeeUnited
States v. Moe, 65 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Kin Sin Lee, 122 F.3d 1058 (2d Cir. 1995) (summary
order affirming the unreported sentencing of one of Lee's co-conspirators, see
1995 WL 595065 (2d Cir. Sept. 11, 1995));United
States v. Hui, 83 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
We affirm Lee's conviction as well, and write because convicting
Lee, the smuggling operation's leader, marks the end of this
cruel saga, and also because of public concern with the growing
trade in illegal immigration and with those like this defendant
who profit hugely from it.
BACKGROUND
I Facts
In early 1992 Lee contacted Weng
Yu Hui, an alien smuggler or "snakehead," asking him
to provide Chinese nationals to be smuggled to the United States.
Lee expected to be paid $15,000 for each person smuggled. The
original plan called for the Chinese passengers to travel on
a ship called the Nadj
II from Thailand to the United States, but that ship was
forced to moor off the coast of Kenya while its 300 passengers
were stranded on board with inadequate food and supplies for
five months. Lee admits that during this time, the Nadj
II's life preservers were sold to buy food and other necessities.
Defendant then orchestrated the
purchase and refitting of a second ship, the Golden
Venture, which arrived from Singapore to pick up the stranded
passengers off the coast of Kenya. Though the Golden
Venture was a cargo ship not licensed to carry passengers,
it was already carrying between 90 and 100 Chinese nationals
when it arrived in Africa where some 200 of the Nadj
II's passengers joined them to continue their voyage to
the United States on the Golden
Venture.
Once aboard, the passengers were
confined to a 20 foot by 40 foot cargo hold that had only one
ladder leading to the deck. Water and food were severely rationed,
and there was no water for personal hygiene. The ship had only
one toilet, the use of which was restricted to the crew, the
Chinese managers of the venture, and the few women passengers
on board. It had no life preservers and only two lifeboats, which
in turn were adequate to carry only the (unusually small) crew
of 14. Passengers who questioned the arrangements were beaten.
The 298 passengers spent between three and six months (depending
whether they had boarded in Asia or in Kenya) on the ship as
it wended its way to the United States.
Lee, who was then in New York, had
hoped initially that he could arrange for small boats to rendezvous
with the Golden
Venture in the Atlantic to pick up the passengers and
transport them to shore. When this plan fell through, he instructed
theGolden Venture
to approach the New York harbor. Defendant ordered Kin Sin Lee,
whom he had hired to travel on the Golden
Venture and oversee its day-to-day operations, via ship-to-shore
radio, to ground the ship at full speed in the dead of night
off the coast of Rockaway Point in Queens. Lee also told Kin
Sin Lee to tell the passengers that those who could swim should
jump off the ship and swim ashore when the boat was grounded,
while the others should wait for someone to pick them up. No
other arrangements were made for disembarking the passengers.
Beginning about midnight on June
6, 1993, the crew began its efforts to ground the ship. After
twice beginning to speed for the shore and then realizing that
the location was unsuitable, the ship finally picked a spot on
the ocean or surf side of Rockaway Point and at about 3:00 a.m.
ran the ship aground. The passengers' only warning that the ship
was being grounded had been given some 12 hours earlier, when
they were told to brace themselves. Chaos ensued. Some passengers
jumped into the rough water, which was below 60F, and ten of
them, as earlier noted, drowned or died of hypothermia.
II Proceedings in the Trial
Court
Lee pled guilty to three counts
on March 11, 1998: conspiracy to smuggle aliens, 18 U.S.C. §
371, smuggling aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1), and seaman's
manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. § 1115. He does not challenge the
first two convictions. On December 1, 1998 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Raggi, J.)
convicted Lee of violating § 1115. That section provides
in relevant part
Every captain, engineer, pilot,
or other person employed on any steamboat or vessel, by whose
misconduct, negligence, or inattention to his duties on such
vessel the life of any person is destroyed, and every owner,
charterer, inspector, or other public officer, through whose
fraud, neglect, connivance, misconduct, or violation of law the
life of any person is destroyed, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
After his plea allocution, Lee submitted
papers to the district court contending, among other things,
that he had not correctly described the events leading up to
the Golden Venture's
grounding. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on these
assertions and on Lee's related motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. The only factual argument defendant presses on appeal is
that he did not, in fact, instruct the ship to ground on theocean
or surf side of Rockaway Point. Rather, Lee testified at the
post-allocution hearing, he had told those in charge of the ship
to ground it on the bay
side. He said that he made this distinction because he had visited
the area and observed that the bay side was sandy, rather than
rocky, and that the water on the bay side was much calmer. Lee
did not present any other evidence as to the relative safety
of the two locations. The district court explicitly found this
testimony not credible and found, in addition, with respect to
a requested sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice,
that the distinction between the two locations was not material.
Lee was thereupon sentenced to a
five-year term on each of the alien smuggling counts and to ten
years on the manslaughter count. These sentences were imposed
consecutively to make a total of 20 years' imprisonment. The
ten-year manslaughter sentence represented a substantial upward
departure from the 33-month upper limit of the Sentencing Guideline
range. Lee appeals both his conviction and sentence for manslaughter.
DISCUSSION
I Conviction
We discuss defendant's conviction
and sentence in order. Lee contends on appeal, as he did in the
district court in an effort to withdraw his guilty plea, that
there is no adequate factual support for his guilty plea to seaman's
manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1115. His argument has two
prongs: first, he insists that the facts as allocuted do not
support conviction; and second, he avers that the "true"
facts, presented to the trial court in papers and at a hearing
after the allocution, do not support conviction. The distinction
Lee makes is that in the second or what he calls the "true"
version of what happened, his order to the Golden
Venture was that it be beached on the bay side of Rockaway
Point. Defendant declares that the facts do not support conviction
because he was not responsible for the passengers' decision to
jump into the freezing water, and that he was therefore not directly
responsible for their deaths. In addition, he maintains that
a "mutiny" on board the Golden
Venture on May 17, 1993 had deprived him of control of
the ship.
We dispose of the "mutiny"
argument first. As we explained in Moe,
65 F.3d at 248, the purpose and effect of the mutiny was to reinforce,
not to lessen, Lee's control of the ship. A disagreement had
developed between the ship's captain, who wanted to stop at Madeira
and perhaps hold one of Lee's employees hostage until small ships
were sent for a mid-Atlantic rendezvous, and Lee's subordinate
Kin Sin Lee, who wanted to continue on to the United States.
Kin Sin Lee and the other Chinese managers successfully seized
control of the ship and remained in contact with Lee, who was
their leader.
With respect to the challenge regarding
the location for grounding, we agree with the trial court that
found any distinction between the ocean and bay side of Rockaway
Point was not material. Lee was responsible for the inhumane
conditions that deprived his passengers of adequate water, food,
sanitation, and opportunity for exercise for weeks on end. He
knew that theGolden
Venture lacked life preservers and life boats. Yet, he
ordered the ship to ground at full speed in the dead of night
in an area with water temperatures below 60F, and ordered the
crew to tell the passengers that those who knew how to swim should
jump overboard. The passengers were not even warned of the time
of impact, and there was no plan or equipment to evacuate them
safely.
Thus, regardless of whether the
beach was sandy or rocky at the point of impact, the multiple
deaths that in fact occurred were an entirely foreseeable result
of Lee's arrangements and orders to his subordinates. The district
court correctly discerned an adequate causal nexus for conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1115. SeeHui,
83 F.3d at 594 ("the intentional grounding of the ship made
it not only foreseeable, but
likely, that deaths would result") (emphasis added); Van
Schaick v. United States, 159 F. 847 (2d Cir. 1908) (applying
a predecessor of § 1115);Hoopengarner
v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1959) ("Where
it reasonably might or should have been foreseen by appellant
that the commission of his act would be likely to create a situation
which would expose another to the danger of injury or death,
[even] at the hand of a non-participant in such reckless conduct,
the creation of such dangerous situation is to be regarded as
the proximate cause of the death of the innocent person."); seegenerallyUnited
States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir. 1976)
(discussing proximate cause in criminal context).
II Sentence
Lee further contends that the district
court erred in sentencing him because it incorrectly found his
testimony not to be credible and because it did not adequately
consider lesser levels of punishment before sentencing him to
the statutory maximum. These contentions are meritless.
We affirm a departure from the sentencing
guidelines if (1) the district court's stated reasons for departure,
reviewed de novo,
are of a kind or a degree not adequately considered by the sentencing
commission and that may appropriately be relied upon to justify
the departure; (2) the factual findings underlying the reasons
are not clearly erroneous; and (3) the extent of the departure
is reasonable, giving due deference to the sentencing court. SeeHui,
83 F.3d at 594; United
States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1995). The
trial court's finding that Lee's testimony was not credible in
his partial recantation of his plea allocution was not clearly
erroneous. In any event, Lee admitted three of the four facts
on which the upward departure was based and did not later challenge
any of them.
Judge Raggi had previously sentenced
Lee's co-conspirators to the statutory maximum for each count, seeHui,
83 F.3d at 594;Kin Sin
Lee, 1995 WL 595065 at *1, or to the statutory maximum
less a downward departure for cooperation with the government,seeMoe,
65 F.3d at 250-51. We have affirmed these sentences. We affirm
here on the same grounds. The sentencing court's stated reasons
for the upward departure included all four factors identified
in the relevant sentencing guideline: dangerous or inhumane treatment;
death of at least six individuals and the bodily injury of many
others; the involvement of 298 aliens,i.e.,
substantially more than 100 aliens; and possession of dangerous
weapons (by Lee's employees on board the Golden
Venture). See
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1, app. n.5 (1992); Hui,
83 F.3d at 594. These are valid reasons for the departure. We
find no error in the underlying factual findings, and the departure
was reasonable.
Nor did the district court err by
not proceeding step-by-step through every possible sentence before
sentencing defendant to the statutory maximum. We have established
that such a step-by-step procedure is not necessary for offense
level ("vertical") departures. SeeTropiano,
50 F.3d at 163; United
States v. Mandel, 991 F.2d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1993). In
the present case, the district court considered the facts that
defendant was the leader of this inhumane venture, the person
who orchestrated and financed it and who gave a direct order
to his employees aboard the ship to ground it. As a consequence,
the upward departure in Lee's sentence reflected a careful and
reasoned application of the sentencing guidelines.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, we
affirm Lee's conviction and his sentence.
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